From: Zack M. Davis Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2026 05:03:29 +0000 (-0700) Subject: drafting "Contra Piper on When Conversation Is Possible" X-Git-Url: https://zackmdavis.net/blog/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=0e55aa1d64477eab4dc40cba8c20fa9c128f7fe7;p=An_Algorithmic_Lucidity.git drafting "Contra Piper on When Conversation Is Possible" --- diff --git a/content/drafts/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md b/content/drafts/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md index e20a069..5a79407 100644 --- a/content/drafts/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md +++ b/content/drafts/contra-piper-on-when-conversation-is-possible.md @@ -13,6 +13,23 @@ Category: philosophy I categorically reject the idea declaring someone else so deceived that their own understanding of their beliefs and motives should be rejected inherently makes conversation with them nearly impossible. -It certainly doesn't make conversation with _me_ impossible. When someone tells me that my understanding of my beliefs and motives should be rejected, I don't take my ball and go home in a huff, muttering that they've made further conversation nearly impossible. +It certainly doesn't make conversation with _me_ impossible. When someone tells me that my understanding of my beliefs and motives should be rejected, I don't take my ball and go home in a huff, muttering that they've made further conversation nearly impossible. Rather, I respond the same way I do to any other disagreement: by supporting my view with reasoning and evidence. Why would the rules be different just because the topic of discussion happens to be my own beliefs and motives? -Rather, I react +One reason why someone might think it's different is for fear that accusations of self-deception are unfalsifiable. I have privileged introspective access to my beliefs and motivations. On what possible basis could someone else tell me I'm wrong? And what reasoning and evidence could I possibly offer to defend the accuracy of my self-perception? If the accusation or its denial can be made just as well independently of any third-party-accessible evidence, then that inherently does make conversation nearly impossible. What would there be to talk about? + +However, I reject the premise that the accusation or its denial can be made just as well independently of any third-party-accessible evidence. I may have privileged introspective access to my beliefs and motivations, but beliefs and motivations aren't epiphenomenal, either. We form beliefs about other entities' beliefs and motivations because such beliefs [let us predict their behavior](https://www.readthesequences.com/Making-Beliefs-Pay-Rent-In-Anticipated-Experiences). An animal that goes to the stream to drink is presumed to be motivated by thirst; the same animal going to the stream depsite it having dried up in the summer heat is presumed to have (falsely) believed that the water would still be there. We don't need to know what it feels like to be the animal in order to speak sensibly of such mental states. + +In the same way, people don't need to know what it feels like to be me in order to speak sensibly about rejecting my own understanding of my beliefs and motives. They could claim that my stated beliefs and motives are inconsistent with my behavior (which they can see) while remaining agnostic about how it feels to be me (which they don't have access to). Such a claim [probably wouldn't be based on nothing at all](/blog/2022/May/plea-bargaining/); indeed, the very existence of persistent disagreements (when you'd expect honest rational agents to simply update on each other's evidence and converge on the correct probability) [suggests that hidden motives are common](/blog/2023/Aug/assume-bad-faith/). + +If I buy cookies for the [salon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salon_(gathering)) from a bakery owned by my girlfriend in Australia (at a substantial markup), it kind of makes sense for other salon members to wonder if my choice might have been biased by nepotism rather than reflecting true optimization towards the goal of the salon having the best desserts. At the same time, my belief that I wasn't swayed by nepotism is something I can provide reasoning and evidence for: I could show the other salon members the notes and spreadsheets I compiled while comparison shopping, which justify my true belief that my girlfriend just happens to be the optimal dessert vendor for the salon. The correctness of my understanding of my beliefs and motives is something I can rationally defend to skeptics in front of third parties; it's not something that needs to be assumed as a prerequisite for even talking at all. + + + +[TODO— + * "sacrificing the ability to communicate with liberals" is proposing beliefs from instrumentality; that's not OK!! + * why would someone do that? I have an hypothesis, but it implies that Piper's self-understanding should be rejected + +/blog/2026/Feb/hazards-of-selection-effects-on-approved-information/ +http://unremediatedgender.space/2016/Sep/psychology-is-about-invalidating-peoples-identities/ + +] \ No newline at end of file