Title: Dispatch from Anthropic v. Department of War Summary Judgment Motion Hearing
-Date: 2026-07-31
+Date: 2026-08-02
Status: draft
Category: social science
Tags: court reporting
-Dateline SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., 30 July 2026— A hearing was held on a motion for summary judgment in the case of _Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War et al._ in Courtroom 4 on the 17th floor of the Phillip Burton Federal Building, the Hon. Judge Rita F. Lin presiding.
+Dateline SAN FRANCISCO, 30 July 2026— A hearing was held on a motion for summary judgment in the case of _Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War et al._ in Courtroom 4 on the 17th floor of the Phillip Burton Federal Building, the Hon. Rita F. Lin presiding.
The case is not going well for the government. Two days after [the last hearing in March](https://zackmdavis.net/blog/2026/Mar/dispatch-from-anthropic-v-department-of-war-preliminary-injunction-motion-hearing/), Judge Lin [issued a preliminary injunction](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.134.0_1.pdf) halting the implementation of President Donald Trump's [order for federal agencies to stop using Anthropic's technology](https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116144552969293195) and preventing the Department of War from designating Anthropic as a supply chain risk.
-With no factual disputes requiring a jury to decide, the case was scheduled to be decided by Judge Lin on the basis of the written record. Anthropic filed [their argument for why they should win](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.166.0_1.pdf). Perhaps tellingly, the government's [rebuttal explaining why they should win instead](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.215.0.pdf) ends on a section explaining that "only modest relief is warranted" if Anthropic wins—and Judge Lin asked Anthropic to propose [what they think the final judgement should look like](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.240.0.pdf). Meanwhile, in Congress, [next year's defense appropriation bill](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8800/text) adds language to the statute on the supply chain risk designation that prohibits designating a domestic company as a supply chain risk for declining contract terms.
+With no factual disputes requiring a jury to decide, the case was scheduled to be decided by Judge Lin on the basis of the written record. Anthropic filed [their argument for why they should win](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.166.0_1.pdf). Perhaps tellingly, the government's [rebuttal explaining why they should win instead](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.215.0.pdf) ends on a section explaining that "only modest relief is warranted" if Anthropic wins—and Judge Lin asked Anthropic to propose [what they think the final judgment should look like](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.240.0.pdf). Meanwhile, in Congress, [next year's defense appropriation bill](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8800/text) adds language to the statute on the supply chain risk designation that prohibits designating a domestic company as a supply chain risk for declining contract terms.
-About a dozen spectators (including the present writer) dotted the gallery Thursday as the parties convened to discuss Judge Lin's [homework questions for both sides](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.242.0_2.pdf). Anthropic's contingent of ten people took up the long counsel table in the center of the courtroom, while the government's two lawyers sat in counsel overflow seating on the left. Michael Mongan of WilmerHale spoke for the plaintiff. The defense swapped in Department of Justice attorney James Harlow to speak (replacing Deputy Assistant Attorney General Eric Hamilton, who filled that role at the preliminary injunction hearing).
+About a dozen spectators (including the present writer) dotted the gallery Thursday as the parties convened to discuss Judge Lin's [homework questions](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.242.0_2.pdf) (four out of five of which were primarily directed at the defendant). Anthropic's contingent of ten people took up the long counsel table in the center of the courtroom, while the government's two lawyers sat in counsel overflow seating on the left. Michael Mongan of WilmerHale spoke for the plaintiff. The defense swapped in Department of Justice attorney James Harlow to speak (replacing Deputy Assistant Attorney General Eric Hamilton, who filled that role at the preliminary injunction hearing).
-[TODO—
+Judge Lin began by saying that the updated record seemed largely as it was at the time of the preliminary injunction—and in some ways, the record got worse for the government. No evidence had emerged that Anthropic had the capability to sabotage a version of their AI model, Claude, after it had been delivered. The Department of War's justification for the supply chain risk designation seemed to rest on the Department's loss of trust in Anthropic due to Anthropic's conduct in refusing to abandon their usage policies to accommodate the Department's desired "all lawful use" terms. "I find that position, if that's really what the government's position is, to be troubling," Judge Lin said.
-Judge Lin said the record was largely the same as for the PI, in some ways the record got worse for the government: no signs that Anthropic could alter the model after deployment
+The first question regarded the defendant's contention that the _Pickering_ framework applied to the present case. The precedent set by [_Pickering v. Board of Education_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pickering_v._Board_of_Education) (1968) says that [the First Amendment rights of government employees need to be balanced against the government's interests as an employer](https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-7-9-4/ALDE_00013549/): a government employee being fired for their speech isn't having their rights violated if a private employer would have fired them, too. Judge Lin asked the defendant whether the _Pickering_ framework applies to the government hitting a contractor with a punishment that goes beyond just terminating the contract.
-the government's position is that Anthropic has inspired just a lack of trust
+Harlow said that it would depend on the nature of the hypothetical punishment. _Pickering_ distinguishes whether a government is acting in its regulatory capacity as a sovereign, or only as an employer. But in the present case, all actions have been about the government's own information technology systems.
-"I find that position, if that's really what the government's position is, to be troubling."
+Judge Lin asked, what if it's only a contract termination, but the government says they're making an example of the contractor?
-G: depends on the nature of the hypothetical punishment
+"Yes, Your Honor, _Pickering_ would apply," Harlow said.
-Pickering distinguishes between regulartoy or sovereign power, vs. acting as an employer
+Judge Lin asked, even if the purpose is to deter other contractors?
-in this case, all actions have been about the gov'ts wn IT
+Harlow replied that if the government says what conduct they won't tolerate from a contractor, that's not an exercise of sovereign power.
-J: what if it's just a contract termination, but the government says they're making an example
-G: Pickering would apply
-J: even if the purpose is to deter other contractors?
-G: the gov't being clear about what it wouldn't tolerate from a contractor, that's not soverign power
-J: what about the secondary boycott?
-G: our position is that there is no secondary boycott
-J: suppose there had been
-G: if goverment said Bank of America couldn't use ANthropci on non-DoW work, that would be regularoty
-J: but Hegseth's directive—would that go beyond pickering. Assum it's applied without limitation, as Hegseht wrote it
+Judge Lin asked about the case of a secondary boycott (the government boycotting those that didn't boycott the offending contractor).
-J: this case is making me think of a lot of hypotheticals, bear with me; I think the shiould be easy if the government said it was terminating contracts for critcism of Trump
-G: Yes, Pickering would apply
-J: suppose the government say to be clear, this is to prevent unfair criticism of the prez
-G: Umber and pickering can handle it (my gloss: it doesn't mean the gov't automatically wins)
-It would be hard for the governemnt to meet its burden
+Harlow said that the Department's position was that there was no secondary boycott in this case.
-J: "I'm surprised that you can't give a yes to what seem to me to be an easy question."
+Suppose there had been, said Judge Lin.
-J: what if gov't say it's because we can't trust you; I assume Pickering still applies
-G: Yes
+Harlow said that if, hypothetically, the government said that Bank of America couldn't use Anthropic models to write code unrelated to any government contracts, that would be an exercise of regulatory sovereign power and _Pickering_ balancing wouldn't apply.
-G: It would come down to the facts, not just the bare statement
+Judge Lin asked if Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's [27 February Twitter announcement](https://x.com/secwar/status/2027507717469049070) that "Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic" would go beyond _Pickering_, if it were applied as written, without limitations.
-G says the government is not a monolith; the 1st amendment analysis of the President's action needs to be separate from the
+Harlow said he couldn't give a categorical answer, because the hypothetical would apply to the facts of some situation. But we didn't need to resort to speculation, he said: in context, Hegseth wasn't exercising authority beyond applying the supply chain risk designation.
-plantiff response
+Judge Lin said the case was making her think of a lot of hypotheticals and asked Harlow to bear with her. She thought this should be easy: if the government announced that it was terminating contracts for criticism of President Trump, _Pickering_ would not apply, right?
-A: Picking doesn't apply because providing AI is not comparable to anything a government employee woudl do
-teh actions were not day to day maangement; they were a use of soverign power
+Harlow said _Pickering_ would apply.
-each of the chalenged actions was soverign power, natsec authority
+Judge Lin said, suppose the government said, to be clear, this is to prevent unfair criticism of the President.
-staggering implications of the answer you just heard
+Harlow said _Pickering_ could handle that case, although it would be hard for the government to meet its burden of showing that its interests as an employer outweighed the contractor's interests in its speech.
-I suspect that the reason weren't got geting a clear answer is that my collegue is a very good lawyer
+"I'm surprised that you can't give a yes to what seems to me to be an easy question," said Judge Lin. What if the government says it's because we can't trust you? Judge Lin supposed that Harlow would say that _Pickering_ still applies.
-J: do you have a view as to wehtehr the actions are separate or as a whole
-A: fact-specific, but on this record, the actions are link
+Yes, Harlow said, but the case would come down to the facts, not just a bare statement of distrust.
-J: would-eviscerate qurstion
-G: no, pickering would apply . Risk assessment memos. Frontier AI is a black box, not like a rifle that gets made to specification that you can inspect. Anthriopcii can put its corporate views into its products; DoW needs to trust
+Judge Lin asked what Harlow thought of an illustrative scenario posed in part (b) of the homework question. "Imagine that a hypothetical future administration has a contract with a private company to procure drones for surveillance," Judge Lin wrote. If the contractor refused to make lethal drones and the administration put up billboards labeling the contractor and its CEO as "enemies of the state" and warning other companies not to do business with them, would _Pickering_ apply?
-J: in the AI context, public criticism is different?
+Harlow responded in the affirmative: in firing a contractor, the state was acting as an employer, not a sovereign. The implications of the billboards within the _Pickering_ balancing would depend on further facts of the scenario. The government wasn't a monolith; in the present case, the First Amendment analysis of President Trump's government-wide ban on Anthropic was distinct from the Department of War's supply chain risk designation.
-G: the leap of trust is greater than with military hardware It's not a one-time deal; the dept needs the latest models
-J: is this really different from other defense contracts, like drones
+Judge Lin gave the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Mongan said that _Pickering_ didn't apply to this case because the challenged actions were not the day-to-day management activities of an employer. The supply chain risk designation is a national security (thus sovereign) authority. He said that he suspected that the reason the Court wasn't getting clear answers from Harlow is "that my colleague is a very good lawyer," but that even if the _Pickering_ precedent applied, Anthropic's First Amendment claim would still prevail.
-G: AI is staggerlying opaque
+Judge Lin asked if the plaintiff had a view on whether the government's actions should be considered separately or as a whole. Mongan said it was fact-dependent in general, but on this record, the White House and the Department of War's actions were clearly linked.
-J: what are the facts that ANthropci might sabotage
+Judge Lin proceeded to her next question for the defendant: would it "eviscerate" First Amendment protections if the government could retaliate against a contractor as long as the government's actions could be described as a breach of trust?
-G; the prime contractor was also concerned (my gloss: the Palantir thing)
-corporate moral judgement
+Harlow said no: the _Pickering_ framework would apply to the facts of the case. The Department had risk assessment memos explaining that frontier AI is a black box, not akin to procuring a shipment of rifles that could be disassembled to check that they were manufactured to specifications.
-and people not cleared at Anthropic talking
+Given that the technology allowed Anthropic to bake its corporate values into its models, the Department needed a greater level of trust in the vendor than it did for military hardware. It wasn't a one-time deal, either, as the Department would need updated models. Judge Lin asked if the situation was that different from other defense contracts: what made AI different from drones? Harlow replied that AI was "staggeringly opaque." Aspects of Anthropic's behavior, such as [questions about classified military operations](https://www.semafor.com/article/02/17/2026/palantir-partnership-is-at-heart-of-anthropic-pentagon-rift) and [hostile communications within the company](https://fortune.com/2026/03/06/anthropic-openai-ceo-apologizes-leaked-memo-supply-chain-risk-designation/), had given the Department reason to fear that they would insert their "corporate moral judgment" into the product. The Department needed to know if Anthropic saw itself as a partner, and case law granted the government substantial deference on this point.
-communication shared with the company (Dario's memo) that expressed hosility)
-do they see thesmevles as a partner
-case law gives deference
+Given an opportunity to reply, Mongan said that the timeline matters: the risk memo was dated 2 March, but Secretary Hegseth and President Trump's actions were on 27 February. He said he would resist the notion that the opaqueness of modern AI obviates First Amendment protections. Anthropic's usage restrictions had been there from the beginning, and there was no indication that Anthropic took steps to interfere with the Department's operations. Taking a stand on usage restrictions is the last thing a saboteur would do. A central concern earlier in the case had been the possibility Anthropic might remotely sabotage the model after it had been delivered, but this had now been confirmed to the Court to not be technically possible. "Despite my colleague's best efforts," he said, the defendant's shifting rationales were powerful evidence of pretext.
-Platiff response—
+Judge Lin proceeded to her next question: have any federal agencies terminated their contracts with Anthropic or begun winding down their usage of Claude since the preliminary injunction was issued? Harlow said the defendants weren't sure what prompted the question, but that the Department of War was in the process of offboarding Anthropic and would be finished by 30 September. Another agency was also offboarding. Other defendant agencies hadn't said, but many were only using Claude through a pilot program involving a third-party provider that would expire on 30 August.
-A": timeline matters. Mar 2 risk memo can't justify Feb 27 actions
+Judge Lin's next question was if any agencies doing national security work had expanded their use of Claude, [including the new Mythos model](https://www.axios.com/2026/04/19/nsa-anthropic-mythos-pentagon).
-resist the notion that AI opaqueness obviates 1st A protection
+Harlow said that the defendants respectfully objected to the question on national security grounds. In any case, any such usage would be irrelevant, since it would have occurred after the challenged actions.
-redlines where there from teh beginning
-no indication that Ant took steps to intefere
-an actual sabatour wouldn't taken a stand on usage restrictions
+Judge Lin said that the reason she was asking is because it would be inconsistent to expand usage of Claude for sensitive work if Anthropic were untrustworthy. She explained that she used to be a prosecutor; sometimes people's actions after a crime shed light on their motives. Harlow said that he was not authorized to give a substantive answer at this hearing but that the defendant could supply the requested information if the Court found it necessary. Judge Lin said she might issue a written order later.
-"Despite my colleague's best efforts"
+The last question concerned whether the remedy in this case should include remanding the matter of the supply chain risk designation back to the Department so that they could make a better case for it. Mongan said that that was fine as a formal matter, but as a practical matter, the record was clear that Anthropic was not an adversary of the state. Harlow said that remand was unnecessary because the Secretary retained the authority to take separate action if warranted.
-the central concern was about ANthropic sabotaging the model after the fact, the shifting rationale is powerful evidnece of pretext
+Then it was time for any closing remarks that the parties wanted to make. Harlow said that the Department was aware of Anthropic's public statements and that the case was not about the company's speech. Regarding the unanswered question about expanded usage of Claude, he said an answer would take some work on the Department's end and asked the Court for a week's time; the difference between two days and a week couldn't matter. Regarding the plaintiff's proposed remedy, Harlow said that any relief should be narrowly tailored to particular actions of particular agencies, and that there was no basis for demanding a compliance report. Regarding the defendant's request for a week, Mongan pointed out that the government had had the homework question since Monday; Anthropic had been suffering unconstitutional harm since February and appreciated the Court and the defendants moving quickly.
-J: windown question
-
-G: we're not sure what prompted this question. DoW wind-down ongoing, to be completed by Sept. 30
-another agency is moving off
-other defendant agencies didn't say; otehrs were only using a pilot program which would expire Aug. 30
-
-J: agencies using more Claude?
-
-G: defendant respectually objects to the question on national security grounds and because it comes after the challenged actions (!!)
-
-J: the reason I'm asking is bvecause it's inconsistent to expand use of Claude if Ant is untrustworhty
-I was a prosecutor; sometimes actions afterwards shed light on motives
-
-G: I'm not authorized ot give a substantive response at this hearing
-
-J: maybe I'll issue a written order
-
-A: we think the question is relevant be we respect national securty; we want redress, if the court thinks importatn
-A: two agencies have paused
-
-J: remand to the department, and sec boycott uinnesccary
-
-A: as a practical matter, ANt is not plausibly an adversary; as a formal matter, OK
-
-G: the secretary would retain authoirty to tkae separate action; remand doens't matter
-
-closing remarks—
-
-the mere fact that ther'es a regulation doesn't make it a sovering power
-DoW was aware of Ant's publci statments and this not about the company's speech
-
-Re asking for who expanded usage of Claude: would ask for a week, would take work on our end; 1 or 2 days is not sufficent; 2 days or a week doenst' matter
-
-proposed order lumps together differne agnecies
-
-we dont' think the facts warrant futher relif
-taileor relief to particular actions and agencies
-
-any proposed order should respect right to not use Anthropic, and there's no basis for a compliance report
-
-A: re the 2 days vs. 1 week, the gov'ts had these questions since Mondau; we've been suffering unconstituational burden since feb and we would like relief expeditiously; we appreciate the court and defendants moving quickly
-
-]
+Then court was adjourned.
projects / An_Algorithmic_Lucidity.git / commitdiff