drafting "Dispatch from Anthropic v. Dept. of War"

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+# Dispatch from Anthropic v. Department of War Preliminary Injunction Motion Hearing
+
+Dateline SAN FRANCISCO, Ca., 24 March 2026— A hearing was held on a motion for a preliminary injunction in the case of _Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War et al._ in Courtroom 12 on the 19th floor of the Phillip Burton Federal Building, the Hon. Judge Rita F. Lin presiding. About 35 spectators in the gallery (journalists and other members of the public, including the present writer) looked on as Michael Mongan of WilmerHale (lead counsel for the plaintiff) and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Eric Hamilton (lead counsel for the defendant) argued before the judge. (The defendant also had another lawyer at their counsel table on the left, and the plaintiff had six more at theirs on the right, but none of those people said anything.)
+
+For some dumb reason, recording court proceedings is banned, so I'm relying on my handwritten live notes to tell you what happened. I'd say that any errors are my responsibility, but actually, it's kind of the government's fault for not letting me just take a recording.
+
+Judge Lin began by describing her understanding of the case. While there was a fascinating public policy debate to be had about the use of artificial intelligence in warfare, that policy debate was not within the court's domain; military policy is set by War Secretary Peter Hegseth. Everyone agrees that the Department of War is free to just stop using Claude. What was at issue in this case was three additional actions taken by the government: banning other federal agencies from using Claude, announcing a secondary boycott forbidding federal contractors from doing their own business with Anthropic, and formally designating Anthropic as a supply chain risk. Judge Lin said that she found it troubling that it looks like the Department of War is trying to punish Anthropic for trying to bring public scrutiny to a contract dispute, quoting Dean W. Ball's characterization of Department's actions as "attempted corporate murder."
+
+The previous day, Judge Lin had [assigned homework questions](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.465515/gov.uscourts.cand.465515.118.0_2.pdf) for the lawyers to answer during the hearing, which she proceeded to read.
+
+The first question concerned [Secretary Hegseth's social 27 February Tweet](https://x.com/secwar/status/2027507717469049070?s=46) declaring that "Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic", and that "This decision is final." Judge Lin asked the defendant's counsel if they agreed that Secretary Hegseth lacked the authority to issue such a broad directive.
+
+Hamilton replied that the language needed to be read in the context of the previous sentence, that the Secretary was "directing the Department of War to designate Anthropic a Supply-Chain Risk". A social media post announcing the process of making the supply chain risk designation was not itself legally binding, and that's how the post was understood by the Department.
+
+Judge Lin expressed skepticism: "You're standing here saying, we said it, but we didn't really mean it." How could Anthropic know? Did the Department of War do anything to take back the Secretary's false statement? Hamilton said that the Department had clarified its position in a letter to Anthropic, and in their filings for the present case.
+
+Judge Lin asked about the scope of the directive: if a contractor that sold toilet paper to the military also used Claude Code in their business, would that be acceptable? Hamilton said that it would: "For non-DoW work, that is not the Department's concern."
+
+Judge Lin asked why Secretary Hegseth would say what he did if it had no legal effect. Hamilton said he wasn't sure, but that the administration was committed to transparency.
+
+Judge Lin asked the plaintiff's counsel if there was still irreparable harm to Anthropic given that the Secretary's announced secondary boycott had no legal effect. Mongan said that while he appreciated the concession, it was a problem that this matter was only being clarified now on 24 March: Secretary Hegseth's 27 February Twitter directive had been read by millions, and the letter served to Anthropic on 4 March hadn't been clear. "Authoritative clarity" was needed to inform people who have Twitter accounts ("X accounts", Mongan said) but not [PACER](https://pacer.uscourts.gov/) accounts (PACER being the electronic court records system), who weren't following these proceedings. Hamilton replied that nothing needed to be clarified; he had already explained how the Department of War understood the post and disabused the plaintiff of their interpretation.
+
+The next question concerned Secretary Hegseth's failure to include a statutorily required discussion of "less intrusive measures" that were considered before pursuing the supply chain risk designation in his notice to Congress. Hamilton agreed that the notification to Congress hadn't included that needed detail, but that this had no bearing on whether an injunction should be granted. Anthropic had no right to enforce that requirement as a third party; the matter was between the Department of War and Congress. The Department should be given three days to amend their notification to Congress, Hamilton argued, and it might end up being classified. Mongan replied that the Administrative Procedures Act was clear that the notification was intended for Congress to review; it wasn't just an FYI.
+
+The next question was about the "less intrusive measures". The defendant had argued that simply transitioning away from using Claude was insufficient to mitigate the risks, because the Department also needed to avoid Claude being in the Department's systems. How broadly did that sweep? If a contractor used Claude Code to write software for the Department, would that be permitted? Hamilton said that that particular fact pattern wouldn't run afoul of the supply chain risk designation. He insisted, however, that the Department shouldn't have to go contract by contract to make sure Claude wouldn't infect DoW systems; Congress had authorized the supply chain risk designation as a tool for this kind of situation.